What Happens When You Analyze a Political Question Like a Business Decision?

Dr. George Monray on the management framework behind his controversial 2015 analysis of Catalan independence

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1/18/20255 min read

What Happens When You Analyze a Political Question Like a Business Decision?

Dr. George Monray on the management framework behind his controversial 2015 analysis of Catalan independence

Contribuciones a la Economia, Eumed, Universidad de Malaga

Political debates are normally conducted through history, identity, law and ideology.

In 2015, Dr. George Monray decided to look at one of Spain's most controversial political questions through a different lens: strategic management.

His paper, La secesión de Catalunya: proceso decisional desde una óptica directiva y empresarial, published in Contribuciones a la Economía, asked what might happen if the economic consequences of Catalan independence were analyzed in the same structured way that a CEO might evaluate a major strategic decision.

The paper explicitly acknowledged the limitations of the analogy. Catalonia is not a company, and citizens are not literally shareholders. Nevertheless, Monray argued that concepts from strategic management could provide an additional framework for examining a complex decision involving risk, opportunities, costs and potential consequences.

His analysis used SWOT methodology, identifying strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats and then considering the probability and potential impact of different scenarios.

Almost eleven years later, Monray says the most important part of the exercise was not the political position it generated, but the attempt to introduce a structured decision-making framework into an emotionally charged debate.

Q: Why did you decide to analyze Catalan independence as if it were a strategic business decision?

Monray: Because I was interested in what happens when you take a highly emotional and politically controversial question and remove, as much as possible, the ideological dimension. In business, senior executives routinely make decisions involving uncertainty, risk, investment and long-term consequences. They don't normally ask only whether they like an option. They ask: What are the benefits? What are the risks? What could go wrong? What is the probability? What would the impact be? I wanted to explore whether some of those principles could be applied to a political-economic question.

Q: Isn't comparing a country or region with a company problematic?

Monray: Absolutely. And I said that explicitly in the paper. A territory is not a company, and citizens are not shareholders in the conventional corporate sense. The comparison is an analytical device. You are effectively saying: if we temporarily look at this problem through the eyes of a strategic-management professional, what variables would we identify? That does not mean that the framework captures every political, social, historical or constitutional dimension.

Q: So what was the purpose of the SWOT analysis?

Monray: SWOT is useful because it forces you to separate different types of variables. Strengths and weaknesses describe the starting position. Opportunities and threats describe potential consequences of a particular strategic direction. In this case, I considered factors such as Catalonia's economic position, geographical location and commercial base, alongside issues involving public finances, investment, financing, trade relationships and international positioning. The objective was to organize those variables rather than simply produce an opinion.

Q: Your paper also assigns probabilities and impacts to different opportunities and threats. Why?

Monray: Because identifying a risk is not enough. In management, a risk becomes more useful analytically when you consider two things: the probability that it occurs and the potential impact if it does. A relatively unlikely event with catastrophic consequences may deserve more attention than a highly probable event with minimal consequences. That was the logic behind the matrix.

Q: What were some of the opportunities you identified?

Monray: The paper considered, among other things, the possibility of greater fiscal resources and greater autonomy in decision-making. The point was not to deny potential benefits. A proper strategic analysis has to identify both positive and negative scenarios. Otherwise it is not analysis; it is advocacy.

Q: And what were the principal risks you considered?

Monray: The paper examined several potential risks, including political and economic instability, additional costs associated with creating state structures, the possible effects of a new economic border, relationships with Spain, questions surrounding European Union membership, financing arrangements and potential reactions from companies and investors. The important point is that these were treated as scenarios and risks to be evaluated, rather than simply as political arguments.

Q: One of your conclusions was that the risks outweighed the potential benefits. Is that still your position?

Monray: The conclusion of the 2015 paper was based on the assumptions, information and scenario framework available at that time. I would distinguish that from making a political recommendation today. The purpose of the paper was to demonstrate what a particular strategic-analysis framework produced when applied to the question. Any contemporary assessment would have to use contemporary data and take into account everything that has happened since 2015.

Q: That's an important distinction. Are you saying that the methodology matters as much as the conclusion?

Monray: I would say that the methodology is the more transferable element. Political circumstances change. Economic conditions change. Institutions change. But the principle of structured decision-making remains relevant. If you are evaluating a major strategic decision, you should identify alternatives, estimate potential consequences, assess uncertainty and distinguish between probability and impact. That applies to companies, investments and many other complex decisions.

Q: Your paper was published during a particularly intense period of the Catalan independence debate. Did that environment influence the research?

Monray: Obviously the context mattered. The issue was highly controversial and generated strong opinions on both sides. That was actually one reason I found a managerial framework interesting. When a subject becomes emotionally charged, there is a greater risk that people select evidence that confirms what they already believe. A structured analytical framework can at least force you to put competing factors on the same table. It doesn't eliminate subjectivity, but it can make the assumptions more visible.

Q: Your paper acknowledges that SWOT itself is subjective. How important is that limitation?

Monray: Very important. SWOT is not a mathematical model that produces an objectively correct answer. The analyst decides which variables to include, how to classify them and how to assess their potential impact. That means the conclusions should always be interpreted in the context of those assumptions. I would never present SWOT as a substitute for detailed economic modelling, legal analysis or political analysis. It is a strategic framework.

Q: What can business executives learn from a political-economic case such as this?

Monray: Perhaps the most important lesson is that strategic decisions should not be reduced to a single variable. A CEO considering an acquisition cannot look only at the purchase price. An investor cannot look only at the potential return. And a government cannot look only at one economic indicator. Complex decisions require multiple variables and an understanding of trade-offs.

Q: Looking back, what is the most interesting aspect of the research?

Monray: The experiment itself. Can a management framework developed for organizations help us structure a much larger societal decision? There are obvious limitations, but I think it is intellectually useful to try. The value is not necessarily in pretending that society is a corporation. The value is in asking whether some of the discipline of strategic decision-making can improve the way we analyze difficult questions.

Q: If you were doing the research today, would you use the same methodology? Monray: I would probably use a much broader analytical framework. Today we have access to much more data and more sophisticated scenario modelling. I would combine qualitative analysis with quantitative economic modelling, sensitivity analysis and multiple scenarios. But I would retain the basic principle: make the assumptions explicit, identify the risks, quantify what can be quantified and distinguish facts from judgments.

Q: And what is the broader lesson for decision-makers?

Monray: Don't confuse conviction with analysis. You can have a strong view about a decision and still subject that view to rigorous analysis. In fact, the more important the decision, the more important it is to do so. That was the reason for approaching such a sensitive subject from a management perspective. Not to replace politics with business. But to ask whether a little more strategic discipline could improve the quality of the decision-making process.